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I. INTRODUCTION
In the seminal 1938 case of NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Tele-
graph Co.,' the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act")2 to generally permit employers to
* Associate Professor, Graduate School of Business, Texas A. & M. University.
** Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Business, Texas A. & M. University. The au-
thors thank Professors William Corbett, Charles Craver, and Clyde Summers for their assistance
in the preparation of this Article.
1. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1988).
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hire permanent replacements for striking workers engaged in eco-
nomic strikes. The so-called Mackay "doctrine" has always been con-
troversial,3 and in the wake of recent strikes where employers have
used permanent replacements on a large scale basis,4 it has become
perhaps the most contentious labor issue on the current scene.5 The
AFL-CIO has been forcefully sponsoring congressional legislation to
overturn the Mackay decision,6 and the Clinton Administration
is backing such legislative reform.7 At the same time, legislation
3. See generally Leonard B. Boudin, The Rights of Strikers, 35 ILL L. REv. 817 (1941)
(arguing that employers have an obligation to bargain with strikers, yet they have an incentive to
hire striker replacements); Samuel Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements, 38 LAB. LJ. 287 (1987)
(describing striker replacement doctrine as the troubled area of American labor law); Julius G.
Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transition: The Paper Industry Example, 102
YALE L.J. 1803 (1993) (suggesting that labor law and industrial relations policy reinforce man-
agement's growing bargaining advantage over unions); Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance:
Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 351 (1984)
(discussing the uneven and unfair manner "in which the NLRA interferes with employees' exer-
cise of economic freedom during a labor dispute").
4. See generally H.R. REP. No. 116, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 20-21 (1993) (citing
AFL-CIO DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYEE BENFrrS, THE PERMANENT REPLACEMENT OF WORK.
ERS STIKING OVER HEALTH CARE BENEFr rS IN 1990 (1991)) (finding that of 243,000 workers
participating in larger strikes in .1990, approximately 11% were permanently replaced); U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: STRIKES AND THE USE OF
PERMANENT STRIKE REPLACEMENTS IN TH 1970s AND 1980s 15 (1991) (finding that permanent
strike replacements were hired in about 17% of the strikes that occurred in 1985 and 1989);
Cynthia L. Gramm, Employers Decision to Operate During Strikes: Consequences and Policy
Implications, in EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN A CHANGING ECONOMY 33-40 (W. Springs ed., 1991)
(comparing pre- and post-1980 studies on the use of striker replacements and arguing that the
willingness of employers to hire permanent replacements has increased in the 1980s).
5. See generally Clifford Krauss, House Passes Bill to Ban Replacement of Strikers, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 1993, at A23 (illustrating the debate between liberals and conservatives regard-
ing the role organized labor should play in American society).
6. See 7 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 571 (June 16,1993). The AFL-CIO-supported legislation in
this area was, however, successfully filibustered in the U.S. Senate during the 103d Congress.
See Catherine S. Manegold, Senators Block Bill to Bar Replacement Strikers, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,
1994, at D23. The AFL-CIO and its congressional supporters have vowed, though, to continue
pursuing this legislation. See Catherine S. Manegold, For 2d Time, Senate Republicans Deal a
Major Defeat to Labor, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1994, at D18. This legislation is, however, unlikely
to make much progress in the new Republican-controlled Congress elected in November, 1994.
See Robert L. Rose, Labor Loses With Defeat of Pro-Union Lawmakers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10,
1994, at A6.
7. Kevin G. Salwen, Labor Secretary Tells Union Delegates Clinton Agenda Duplicates
Their Goals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6,1993, at A2; see also Letter from Secretary of Labor, Robert B.
Reich, to Hon. William D. Ford, Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor, reprinted in
H.R. REP. No. 103-116, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 37-38 (1993) (endorsing H.R. 5, which
would protect employees who "exercise their right" to strike from being replaced). Labor Secre-
tary Robert Reich has reiterated the Clinton Administration's continued support for such re-
form even after the July 1994 Senate filibuster on the issue. See Interview with Robert Reich,
Labor Secretary of the United States, This Week With David Brinkley (ABC television broad-
cast, Sept. 4, 1994) (transcript on file with the Southern California Law Review).
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designed to achieve this purpose has been enacted in both the state of
Minnesota' and in the city of St. Louis,9 and proposals are pending in
various other state and local jurisdictions. 10 The issue came to the
fore of public attention during the fall of 1993 when AMR Corpora-
tion, the parent company of American Airlines, threatened to perma-
nently replace striking flight attendants." This situation was avoided
only because of direct intervention in the strike by President
Clinton.'2
The issue has also recently commanded considerable attention in
academic circles, with commentators presenting a wide variety of ar-
guments regarding the continued viability of the Mackay doctrine.
Some scholars have advocated the outright overruling of Mackay and
a ban on any employer hiring of permanent striker replacements,
along the lines of the proposed Clinton Administration legislation on
the subject.' 3 Others have advocated some modifications to the Mac-
kay doctrine, but without an outright ban on employer hiring of per-
manent replacements.' 4 Finally, a number of scholars have simply
argued that the Mackay doctrine should be left alone.'"
8. See Mn4. STAT. § 179.12(9) (1993). This Minnesota legislation has, however, been re-
cently held by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to be preempted by the National
Labor Relations Act. Employers Association Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 32 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir.
1994).
9. See 5 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 153 (Feb. 13, 1991).
10. See Albert R. Karr, A Special News Report on People and Their Jobs in Offices, Fields
and Factories, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1991, at 1.
11. See Terry Maxon, Strike Hinders American Passenger Flights, DALLAS MORNING NEws,
Nov. 19, 1993, at 1A, 24A; Bridget O'Brian, American Air Strike Strands Thousands of Fliers,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1993, at B1.
12. See Bruce Ingersoll & Bridget O'Brian, Clinton's Intervention Halts the Costly Strike at
American Airlines, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1993, at Al.
13. See, eg., Matthew W. rmkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike,
1990 U. ILL L. REv. 547; Michael H. LeRoy, Changing Paradigms in the Public Policy of Striker
Replacements: Combination, Conspiracy, Concert, and Cartelization, 34 B.C. L. Rv. 257 (1993);
Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Turn It Off, Tune It Out, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 295 (1991); David
Radtke, Note, Banning the Use of Permanent Replacements: Slaying Its Opponent's Trojan
Horse, 3 DEr. C.L. RFv. 881 (1992).
14. See, eg., William R. Corbett, A Proposal for Procedural Limitations on Hiring Perma-
nent Striker Replacements: 'A Far, Far Better Thing' Than the Workplace Fairness Act, 72 N.C. L.
REv. 813 (1994); Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must be Revised to Pre-
serve Industrial Democracy, 34 Aiuz. L. REv. 397 (1992); George S. Roukis & Mamdouh L
Farid, An Alternative Approach to the Permanent Striker Replacement Strategy, 44 LAB. L. 80
(1993); Note, One Strike and You're Out? Creating an Efficient Permanent Replacement Doc-
trine, 106 HARv. L. REv. 669 (1993).
15. See, eg., Brendan Dolan, Mackay Radio: If It Isn't Broken, Don't Fix It, 25 U.S.F. L.
REv. 313 (1991); David Westfall, Striker Replacements and Employee Freedom of Choice, 7 LAB.
LAW. 137 (1991); Matthew T. Golden, Student Article, On Replacing the Replacement Worker
Doctrine, 25 CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PRoBS. 51 (1991).
1995]
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Among the more prominent scholars taking this final approach
are Professors Michael L. Wachter and George M. Cohen of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania and the University of Pittsburgh Law Schools
respectively, who have applied the economic theory of "internal" and
"external" labor markets to striker replacement and other employ-
ment law issues.16 Professors Wachter and Cohen argue that the Mac-
kay doctrine is economically "efficient" and should not be legislatively
altered.' 7
In this Article, we directly attack Professors Wachter and Co-
hen's assertion regarding the economic efficiency of the Mackay doc-
trine. Applying internal and external labor market analysis, we argue
that the Mackay doctrine is economically inefficient because it allows
employers to behave "opportunistically" with respect to employees
that have made "firm-specific" investments in their employing firms.18
To remedy this problem we propose a new "negotiations approach,"
the components of which are: (1) the statutory overruling of Mackay,
and (2) the concomitant amendment of the NLRA to make the striker
replacement issue a "mandatory" subject of collective bargaining.
The thrust of our proposal is on negotiation: on letting the parties
themselves, without outside intervention, resolve this important and
complex issue. Our analysis and proposal is developed in the context
of (1) the fall of 1993's high-profile strike at American Airlines, and
(2) a recently enacted Italian statute 9 that deals with issues surround-
ing the conduct of labor strikes.
Part II below outlines the current approach to the striker replace-
ment issue, while in Part III we present our economic analysis of the
issue and our attack on the Wachter and Cohen assertion that the
Mackay doctrine is economically efficient. We present this analysis
against the backdrop of the fall of 1993 American Airlines strike. In
Part IV we develop our proposed negotiations approach, drawing in
16. See Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective
Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure,
and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1349 (1988); George M. Cohen & Michael L. Wachter, Re-
placing Striking Workers: The Law and Economics Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK
UNvEsrr 43RD ANNUAL NA-IONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 109 (Bruno Stein ed., 1990)
[hereinafter NEw YORK PROCEEDINGS].
17. See NEw YORK PROCEEDINGS, supra note 16, at 118-19.
18. See infra part Ill.
19. See Act No. 146 of June 12, 1990, 137 Gazz. Uff. 6 (June 14, 1990), translated in I.L.O.
Legislative Services, iTA 1, at 93 (1990).
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part on the new Italian statute. Finally, in Part V we present our
conclusion.
II. THE CURRENT APPROACH
The right to strike20 is a statutory right granted by the NLRA.21
Section 7 of the NLRA provides that "[e]mployees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection."'22 Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act makes it an unfair labor practice for the employer to interfere
with the exercise of that right.P
In addition, the right to strike is directly mentioned in section 13
of the Act which provides that nothing in the Act, except as otherwise
provided, "shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or
qualifications on that right."'24 Moreover, section 2(3) of the Act pro-
vides that workers that are on strike still retain their status as "em-
ployees" of the given firm.'
During the past fifty-plus years, the legal rights of striking em-
ployees and their employers have been in large measure defined by
20. A strike can be defined as a cessation of work as a means of forcing compliance with
some demand upon the employer. See Jeffrey A. Spector, Comment, Replacement and Reinstate-
ment of Strikers in the United States, Great Britain, and Canada, 13 CoMP. LAB. LJ. 184 (1992).
21. Strikes can be first categorized as legal or illegal. An illegal strike is one that uses
illegal means or one that is in violation of a strike agreement. Illegal strikes are not protected
activities under the NLRA and employers may discharge employees participating in these kind
of strikes without violating the Act. Legal strikes can be in turn classified as unfair labor prac-
tice strikes or economic strikes. Unfair labor practice strikes occur in response to an employer's
alleged unfair labor practice. Unfair labor practice strikers are protected under the NLRA to a
greater extent than any other kind of striker, and unfair labor practice strikers cannot be perma-
nently replaced. Economic strikes are defined as any strike other than illegal or unfair labor
practice strikes. 'They occur when the union strikes with the objective of forcing the employer to
agree to a union's bargaining demand. See generally ROBERT A. GoRMAN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATMoN AND COLLECrIvE BARGAINING 341-52 (1976) (explaining the basic
distinctions between the economic striker and the unfair labor practice striker); Corbett, supra
note 14 (arguing that while the current law regarding striker replacements should be changed,
the distinction between economic striker and unfair labor practice striker should remain).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
23. Id. § 158(a)(1).
24. Id. § 163.
25. Id. § 152(3).
1995]
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the Supreme Court's 1938 Mackay decision.2 6 In Mackay, the em-
ployer, a corporation engaged in the transmission and receipt of tele-
graph, radio, cable, and other messages, was struck in the San
Francisco area by the American Radio Telegraphists Association.27 In
order to maintain operations, the employer, who had offices in several
other parts of the country, brought employees from other offices to fill
the strikers' places.' When the strike was over, the employer refused
to reinstate some of the strikers, arguing that some of the replace-
ments had decided to stay in the San Francisco area and therefore
would not be discharged in order to reinstate the strikers.29
The union filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or "Board"), arguing that the employer had violated the
Act by (1) hiring permanent replacements, and (2) discriminatorily
failing to reinstate several strike activists because of their union activi-
ties.30 The NLRB held that the employer had indeed discriminated
against the strike activists. As to the issue of the striker replacements,
however, the NLRB held that the NLRA did not forbid the employer
froin hiring permanent striker replacements.3 ' The Supreme Court
upheld the Board on both counts, holding that the employer had dis-
criminated against the strike activists,3 2 but that it was not a violation
of the Act for the employer to hire striker replacements and to offer
those replacements permanent positions.33
Mackay thus appears to grant employers broad authority to per-
manently replace economic strikers, and consequently gives little pro-
tection to many striking employees with regard to their jobs. The
Mackay doctrine, however, has been limited in several respects. First,
the Court has limited the terms of employment that firms can offer
striker replacements. In particular, the Supreme Court has held that
employers cannot, in order to attract replacement workers, offer these
replacements super seniority or higher rates of pay than that received
by the strikers. 4 Second, once the strike is over, and the strikers have
26. NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
27. lId at 336-37.
28. lI
29. Id. at 337-39.
30. Id. at 340.
31. "Instead, we assume merely for the sake of argument that the respondent was entitled
to retain these strikebreakers and that such retention was not a discrimination within the mean-
ing of Section 8, subdivision (3)." Mackay Radio and Tel. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 201, 216-17 (1936).
32. See Mackay, 304 U.S. at 343-51.
33. Id. at 345-46.
34. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
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indicated an unconditional desire to be reinstated, the employer must
reinstate the strikers to the same or substantially similar jobs as soon
as openings occur.
Finally, the Court has directly limited the use of Mackay as an
anti-union devise. It has frequently been asserted that the hiring of
permanent replacements under the Mackay doctrine is simply a way
for employers to engage in "union-busting"-that is, to get rid of the
36Thidaunion. The idea, of course, is that by replacing union adherents with
permanent new employees, support for the union will be under-
mined,37 precipitating a "good faith doubt" on the part of the em-
ployer that the union continues to enjoy the support of a majority of
employees. Employers have in the past been able to lawfully with-
draw their recognition of a given union and stop bargaining with it
under such circumstances. 38
In the 1990 case of NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.,39
however, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no automatic pre-
sumption that strike replacement workers are opposed to an incum-
bent union. According to the Court, employers must have clear proof
that newly hired replacement workers oppose union representation
before assuming any "good faith doubt" as to the desire for union
representation on the part of these workers.40 In a strong dissent,
though, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that
[s]ince the principal employment-related interest of strike replace-
ments (to retain their jobs) is almost invariably opposed to the prin-
cipal interest of the striking union (to replace them with its striking
members) it seems ... impossible to conclude.., that the employer
did not have a reasonable, good-faith doubt regarding the union's
majority status.4a
35. See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B.
1366 (1968), enforcing 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
36. See generally Legislative Hearing on H.R. 3936 Before the Subcomm. on Labor Manage-
ment Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 37-49 (1990)
(testimony of Lynn R. Williams, President, United States Steelworkers of America; arguing for
the enactment of H.R. 3936); id. at 9-15 (testimony of Thomas R. Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer,
AFL-CIO; arguing in favor of overthrowing the "permanent" striker replacement doctrine of
Mackay).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 116, supra note 4, at 26-28 (discussing the detrimental effect of the
Mackay doctrine on the collective bargaining process).
38. See, e.g., S & M Mfg. Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 1008 (1968); Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 135
N.L.R.B. 196 (1962); Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440 (1959).
39. 494 U.S. 775 (1990).
40. Id. at 786-96.
41. Id. at 801.
1995]
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In sum, employers may hire replacement workers to help them
operate during a strike. However, while workers striking over unfair
labor practices have an automatic right to reinstatement at the end of
the work stoppage, economic strikers have very limited reinstatement
rights. If permanent replacements have not been hired, economic
strikers may claim their former jobs. Where permanent replacements
have been hired, however, economic strikers are generally entitled to
reinstatement only as vacancies occur.
III. THE FIRM SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS PROBLEM
A. OVERVmW
A major drawback that seems to exist under the current striker
replacement law is its failure to minimize "opportunistic behavior" be-
tween the employers and unions. Providing employers with the blan-
ket right to hire permanent replacements for economic strikers makes
it very difficult to differentiate between those situations where the em-
ployer really needs to hire such workers in order to continue opera-
tions, and those cases where the employer is engaging in arguably
opportunistic behavior. However, if the Mackay doctrine was over-
turned and unions were given total protection against the hiring of
permanent replacements, employers might well be subject to some
form of opportunistic behavior on the part of unions.
A key distinction that should be made to deal with this issue is
the level of firm-specific investments the workers involved in the
strike have made. In order to understand how distinguishing the level
of worker firm-specific investments sheds some light on the striker
replacements policy debate, we need to first develop the concepts of
external and internal labor markets.
Professors Wachter and Cohen have, as noted above,42 recently
developed a preliminary analysis of the striker replacements issue
from an internal and external labor markets perspective. They argue
that the current rules governing the replacement of striking workers
"promote economic efficiency" by diminishing the likelihood of op-
portunistic behavior by both unions and employers.43 Although we
agree with Professors Wachter and Cohen that limiting opportunistic
behavior should be a major focus of striker replacement policy, we
42. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
43. See NEW YoRK PRocEEDiNGs, supra note 16, at 118-19.
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take issue with their approach. Unlike them, we believe that the cur-
rent rules governing striker replacements need to be reformed.
B. SKILL SPECIFICITY AND OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR
In their analysis, Professors Wachter and Cohen develop at length
the differences between internal and external labor markets.44 They
point out that the external market is where workers seek new jobs,
searching among different firms for the best conditions.45 They deem
this market to be generally efficient and assert that any government
intervention is likely to decrease efficiency.4
Efficiency in the external labor market arguably breaks down,
however, when there is a need for firm-specific training; that is, the
learning of skills clearly specific to a given firm.47 In such situations,
Professors Wachter and Cohen point out that internal labor markets
provide an alternative to exclusive reliance on the use of external la-
bor market analysis.' By "internalizing" parts of the employment re-
lationship, firms can potentially encourage workers to make long-term
investments with them, which in turn produces technological and cost
efficiencies for the firm." However, internal labor markets can them-
selves be inefficient50 because of the highly "specific" nature of the
investments that workers and employers may be making in each
other.51 More precisely, firms frequently invest heavily in the training
of workers while workers invest heavily in learning skills that may be
applicable only to the given firm.52 This creates a situation of "sunk
investments" on both sides, investments that may be lost if either
workers switch jobs or firms discharge workers.53 In order to protect
44. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 16, at 1355-85.
45. Id. at 1353.
46. Id.
47. Firm-specific skills can be defined as skills that are idiosyncratic to the particular firm,
and thus not easily transferable to other firms. General skills, on the other hand, are skills that
are easily transferable across firms in the same industry. ld. at 1355-64; see also GARY BECKER,
HumAN CAPrr~A 29-30 (1964) (explaining that skills can be acquired through schooling and on-
the-job training).
48. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 16, at 1357.
49. Id. at 1358.
50. See NEw YORK PROCEEDINGS, supra note 16, at 114; see also Michael L. Wachter &
Randall D. Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor Markets, in TiE ECONOMICS OF HumAN
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 86-108 (Daniel J.B. Mitchell & Mahmood A. Zaidi eds., 1990) (dis-
cussing the economics of the internal labor market).
51. See NEw YORK PROCEEDINGS, supra note 16, at 114.
52. Id.
53. "Sunk investments are investments that have already occurred and cannot be recalled."
Wachter & Cohen, supra note 16, at 1360 n.43.
1995]
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these sunk investments, employers and workers generally enter into
implicit or explicit contracts.
"Opportunistic" behavior appears when one party or the other
attempts to breach these implicit or explicit contracts.5 4 In such situa-
tions, one party can be seen as trying to "expropriate" the returns that
the other party expects out of its investments.55 In this regard, Profes-
sors Wachter and Cohen argue that workers generally make firm-spe-
cific investments early in their careers and then recoup such
investments "as they age."'56 Employees arguably invest by agreeing
to a below-market wage early in their careers, with the expectation
that later on they will receive above-market compensation.5 7 For ex-
ample, employees may, early in their careers, engage in learning a skill
that is specific to a particular employer. While doing this, they will
likely agree to receive a below-market wage with the implicit contract
or expectation that later on they will be permitted to stay in the firm
and recover their investments in the form of above-market compensa-
tion. Thus, if the employer terminates the employment relationship
with their employees after the employees have learned the firm-spe-
cific skill and the employer has recovered its investment, but before
the employees are able to recover their investments, the employees'
investments will be lost.58
Similarly, an employer may invest in employees' careers by pay-
ing them more than their marginal productivity at a very early or later
stage of their careers, with the expectation that the employer will re-
cover its investments during the employees' mid-career years.59 Dur-
ing this middle period, these employees could potentially behave
"opportunistically" and make it difficult for their employer to recover
its investment.60
As Professors Wachter and Cohen point out, labor law can be
seen as helping create efficient contracts that lend towards the preven-
tion of opportunistic behavior.61 They state that labor law should
54. Id. at 1360.
55. Id.
56. In particular, Wachter and Cohen argue that "[w]orkers make sunk investments in their
jobs by agreeing to long-term implicit contracts that provide for 'deferred compensation,' that is,
below-market wages at early stages of employment and above-market wages at later stages." Id.
57. I.
58. Id. at 1361.
59. Id.
60. IM.
61. IM. at 1364-77.
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"create incentives under which the lower cost party automatically
loses profits whenever it acts strategically, so that the contract is par-
tially self-enforcing."'6 Seniority and other sorts of "tenure" provi-
sions,63 for example, protect workers from the potential opportunistic
behavior of firms that have recouped their investments and who
would be willing to fire older workersfr4 In academia, for example,
younger professors may invest time serving on idiosyncratic university
committees and engage in other firm-specific endeavors with the as-
surance that if they earn tenure, the university cannot simply turn
around and fire them when they are sixty-three years old and less pro-
fessionally active.65
Professors Wachter and Cohen view the NLRA's striker replace-
ments doctrine as deterring opportunistic behavior by firms and work-
ers with respect to the efficient operation of internal labor markets.66
Their line of analysis is that if an employer is trying to cut worker
wages below market levels, workers will go on strike. These workers
would have little to fear because potential replacement workers hired
pursuant to Mackay "would not accept jobs that offer a stream of fu-
ture wages below competitive levels." 67 Moreover, any replacement
workers who did accept jobs would be reluctant to make sunk or firm-
specific investments in a firm that had developed a "reputation for
opportunistic behavior. '68
Conversely, however, if union workers are receiving, or trying to
receive, above-market wages, they will have to face the reality that
replacement workers will be eager to. take these jobs. Thus, if they
engage in an economic strike under such conditions, it is likely that
they will be permanently replaced pursuant to Mackay.69 However,
under Supreme Court interpretations of the NLRA, firms, as noted
above,70 are not able to offer replacements wages or seniority beyond
62. Id at 1361.
63. See NEw YORK PROCEEDINGS, supra note 16, at 115-16.
64. See Wachter & Wright, supra note 50, at 96.
65. See generally RICHARD P. CHAIT & ANDREw T. FORD, BEYOND TRADrTONAL TEN-
URE (1982) (examining the changes taking place in the traditional concept of tenure); BARD-
WELL L. SMrm, TIE TENURE DEBATE (1973) (explaining the different perspectives in the
debate over tenure). For some cases discussing this, see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (discussing tenure as a "property" right).
66. See NEw YORK PROCEEDINGS, supra note 16, at 118.
67. Id.
68. I&
69. It at 119.
70. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
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what the striking workers receive,7 1 a fact that Professors Wachter and
Cohen note reduces possible opportunistic behavior on the part of
firms and promotes internal labor market efficiency.72
We believe that Professors Wachter and Cohen are precisely cor-
rect in pointing out that the underlying conflict involved in the striker
replacement decision can be properly characterized as the problem of
opportunistic or strategic behavior. We argue, however, that the effi-
ciency model as currently developed by them fails to capture several
important dimensions of the industrial relations process.
There are two major problems with the Mackay doctrine that are
not addressed by Professors Wachter and Cohen's line of analysis.
First, there is a potential problem with relying on the external labor
market as a check on opportunistic behavior. Second, if the specificity
of training (that is, sunk investment) is the key element in creating a
situation that is ripe for opportunistic behavior, it seems that the gov-
erning legal doctrine should distinguish between those situations in
which this kind of an investment has been made, and those where it
has not.
C. RELIANCE ON Ti= ExTERNAL LABOR MARKET
1. Background
A key element in the Wachter and Cohen model is the use of the
external labor market as a check on the occurrence of opportunistic
behavior by both unions and employers. The notion is that the exter-
nal labor market will prevent employers from "cheating" by making it
impossible for them' to hire replacements if they have developed a
reputation of behaving opportunistically. Similarly, unions will not be
able to push for above-market wages because employers can hire
replacements in the external labor market at the market wage. As
Professor Wachter has argued elsewhere:
The external labor market is the benchmark for any analysis of the
[internal labor markets]. It provides the opportunity costs of alter-
native employment for workers, and of alternative workers for
firms. Workers in the [internal labor markets] always have opportu-
nities to find jobs with other firms, and these external opportunities
provide limits below which their rewards cannot fall. Similarly,
firms can hire new workers from the [external labor market] and
discharge workers who fail to meet work standards. Although the
71. See NEW YoRK PROCEEDINGS, supra note f6, at 119.
72. Id. at 119-20.
HeinOnline  -- 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 374 1994-1995
STRIKER REPLACEMENTS
wages and other terms and conditions of employment are set ad-
ministratively by the firm, they must ultimately rest on the opportu-
nities for hiring new workers into port-of-entry [internal labor
market] jobs from the external market[s].73
The problem with reliance on the external market is twofold. First,
conceptually it is troubling that Professors Wachter and Cohen rely on
the external labor market when it is the inability of the external labor
market to deal with firm specificity that is the main factor underlying
the creation of internal labor markets.74 Were it not for the need for
firm-specific training, firms would be better off making all employ-
ment transactions in the external labor market.75 However, the exter-
nal labor market is unable to manage the problems associated with
increasing transaction costs and information asymmetry due to the in-
creasing need for firm-specific training. It thus seems unrealistic to
expect the external labor market to provide an adequate check on the
employer's opportunistic behavior.
Second, the argument for reliance on the external labor market as
a check on opportunistic behavior is, in practice,76 refutable. The
main argument in the Wachter and, Cohen efficiency model is that the
Mackay doctrine controls opportunistic behavior in two ways. First,
when an employer tries to cut worker wages below market levels, and
workers respond by going on strike, the employer will find it difficult
to find replacements who will accept jobs that offer a compensation
package below competitive levels.77 Second, if the firm develops a
reputation for opportunistic behavior, replacement workers will be re-
luctant to make sunk or firm-specific investments.78 We submit that
both of these propositions are questionable.
2. Replacement Worker Willingness to Accept Below-Market Wages
There appear to be several conditions in which workers might be
willing to take jobs that offer below-market compensation. Although
agreeing to take a job that pays below-market wages might not be the
"rational" decision for a worker moving within the same industry, it
73. See Wachter & Wright, supra note 50, at 89-90.
74. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
75. As Wachter and Cohen point out, "these markets (external labor markets) approach
allocative efficiency because of the mobility of workers and competition among firms for these
workers." Wachter & Cohen, supra note 16, at 1353.
76. See infra notes 79-95 and accompanying text.
77. See NEw YORK PROCEEDINGS, supra note 16, at 118.
78. Id.
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might be an acceptable decision for workers moving across industries,
as the wages individuals find acceptable vary considerably among in-
dustries.7 9 Given this variation in reservation wages, individuals in
low-wage industries might be willing to move to a new industry, even
if they are not being paid market wages in that new industry, because
at least their wages will be above their previous employment. Simi-
larly, individuals may be willing to accept below-market wages in or-
der to gain entry to a field or industry that is generally hard to enter,
or in other words, an industry that has high barriers to entry.80
Moreover, we could also see workers being paid below-market
wages in situations where workers implicitly agree to "pay" in order to
receive some specialized training from the employer. As Professors
Wachter and Cohen point out, this is the nature of implicit labor
contracts.8 '
The assertion that workers will not accept below-market compen-
sation is a characterization of an equilibrium and long-term situation
in an otherwise competitive market.8 Strikes, however, are not a sus-
tained long-term phenomenon, but finite, short-term events. Thus, an
employer might find it possible to pay below-market wages to its
replacements only for the duration of the strike, and if necessary, after
the strike is over and the union defeated, the employer can increase
wages to more accurately reflect the market.8 3
Finally, the below-market-wage argument is likely to truly hold
only in a competitive market.84 Any deviations from this construct or
characterization, such as high unemployment rates or other market
distortions, will challenge this proposition. 5
79. The reservation, or acceptance, wage is that wage below which no employment offer
will be accepted. See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOM-
ics 445-50 (1982).
80. Indeed, anything that increases individuals' need for current income as compared to
future income (their "discount rates") is likely to lead to a lowering of reservation wages. See id.
at 449.
81. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 16, at 1361-64.
82. In the long run, we should expect that as information is exchanged the parties will
arrive at equilibrium solutions.
83. What we argue here is that the employer can attract striker replacements by offering
them more than what their best alternative will be (for example, the employer's final offer to the
union), but slightly less than what the union's final demand was. This strategy, although not
sustainable in the long run, can be successfully used during the duration of a strike.
84. See generally DOUOLAS LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: PROCESS
AND POLICY 54-57 (1985) (discussing the labor law implications of failures in the competitive
market model).
85. Id.
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3. Replacement Worker Willingness to Accept Positions Despite Bad
Employer "Reputation"
Second, we argue that "reputation" issues are not necessarily as
significant in the striker replacement setting as they might be in other
economic and social transactions. Indeed, replacement workers may
be quite willing to accept positions despite a given employer's bad
reputation.
When an employer hires striker replacements, the argument
could be made that the employer is abrogating a sort of implied con-
tract with the union.86 The reputation that the employer is purport-
edly damaging is the reputation it has established with unionized
employees. This reputation, we argue, is not necessarily transferable
to the employer's dealings with nonunionized employees.
Labor relations in the 1970s and beyond have been characterized
by increasing employer resistance towards unions' and a sharp de-
cline in the percentage of workers who are members of private sector
unions to a recent low of about fifteen percent.8 8 A fairly common
practice is for employers to move existing production facilities, and
plan expansions, to nonunionized settings.89 This practice, although
not "per se" illegal, clearly parallels the striker replacement situation.
In both cases it can be argued that the employers are abrogating a sort
of implied contract with given unions and are thus acquiring a certain
type of negative reputation. 90
However, there do not appear to be any documented reputa-
tional problems for employers engaged in this "greenfield" type of
86. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 16, at 1386-1414.
87. THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THs TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RE-
LATIONS 67-80 (1986) (discussing the emergence during the 1970s of alternative nonunion sys-
tems in several major U.S. industries).
88. See MONTHLY LAB. RFv. (U.S. Dept. of Lab.), Mar. 1993, at 2.
89. See KocHAi Er AT-, supra note 87, at 47-80. Professors Kochan, Katz, and McKersie
provide ample evidence of the occurrence of this "greenfield" strategy. They note that some
firms adopted a complete nonunion strategy, such as consolidating all their operations in their
nonunion plants, while others left currently unionized plants undisturbed, but were increasingly
reluctant to let new plants unionize.
90. In Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), the Court held
that there is no duty to bargain over the decision to terminate operation of an entire business,
regardless of the reasons motivating the decision. But see Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B.
386, 393 (1991) (stating that employers in some circumstances may be required to bargain over
plant relocation).
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strategy, and such employers have not had any major problems in at-
tracting new workers." New employees believe that they will be bet-
ter off in the new situation and are willing to make whatever
investments are called for in the new employment relationship. 2
In addition to the fact that the reputation that an employer ac-
quires when replacing strikers does not necessarily translate into that
employer's relationship with nonunion employees, reputational effects
are reduced in the striker replacement setting because of the strong
protection replacement workers receive under the NLRA. In Bel-
knap, Inc. v. Hale,93 for example, the Supreme Court recently held
that the NLRA does not preempt state court actions where employers
renege on promises to give striker replacements permanent jobs. The
Supreme Court emphasized the grievous harm that misrepresenta-
tions of this kind can cause innocent workers who thought the replace-
ment positions were of a permanent nature.94 Moreover, in the Curtin
Matheson Scientific case, as noted above,95 the Supreme Court ruled
that there is no automatic presumption that striker replacement work-
ers are opposed to an incumbent union. Both of these decisions send
the signal to" replacement workers that even if their new employer
behaves opportunistically, with respect to future employment deci-
sions, they retain considerable protection.
D. GENERAL AND SPECIFIC SKILLS
1. Theoretical Framework
If our argument above is correct, then the Mackay rule ultimately
leaves employees that have invested in firm-specific training unpro-
tected and more vulnerable to opportunistic employer behavior than
91. Judging on the basis of the positive outcomes achieved by these firms in terms of em-
ployee involvement and motivation, firms adopting these strategies do not appear to show signs
of a negative reputational effect.
92. Firms adopting the "greenfield" strategy usually accompanied it with the adoption of
new innovations in human resource management, such as participatory systems, teamwork, and
quality circles. The expectation is thus created that the whole atmosphere of employer-em-
ployee relations will be different in the new workplace. See generally KOCHAN OT AL., supra
note 87, at 81-108 (citing the emergence of new management techniques in nonunion work-
places). But see Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992) (placing limits on such par-
ticipatory systems under the NLRA).
93. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
94. Id. It is true, however, that the Belknap decision also instructed employers on how to
insulate themselves from liability through use of "correct" language in the offer of permanent
replacement. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 503; see Burr E. Anderson, "Permanent" Replacements of
Strikers After Belknap: The Employer's Quandary, 18 JOHN MARSHALL L. Rv. 321, 336 (1985).
95. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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employees that have not invested in firm-specific training. Simply put,
the ability of employers to behave opportunistically is directly affected
by the type of investments striking workers have made. The critical
distinction here is between employees that have heavily invested in
firm-specific skills and those that acquired mainly general skills.
Skill specificity and investment makes it possible under alterna-
tive legal standards for both the union and the employer to behave
opportunistically or strategically. As discussed above,96 the motiva-
tion for either party to behave strategically is grounded on the invest-
ment made by the other party. Once the investment is made, the
opposing party can extract the rents due to the investing party. In-
vestment occurs only in situations where employees are required to
learn skills specific to the firm. When learning firm-specific skills em-
ployees must partially pay for their training by accepting a below-mar-
ket wage during the training period. Having invested in the firm-
specific skills, employees are then very vulnerable to the employer be-
cause the employees' investment in the firm-specific skills has given
the employer the opportunity to behave strategically. 7
On the other hand, if employees have not invested in firm-spe-
cific skills, but instead have acquired mainly general training, employ-
ees are less vulnerable to the employer's strategic behavior.98 In cases
where employees are mainly required to perform tasks that require
skills that are easily transferable in the external labor market, employ-
ees do not have to invest in the form of below-market wages early in
their careers. 99 Thus, even if the employees' employment is termi-
nated, as in the case of being permanently replaced while on strike,
employees have not suffered a significant loss on their investment."°
As compared to the case of firm-specific investments, the employer is
not in any strategic position to expropriate the employees' rents.
The skill specificity distinction also affects the union's ability to
behave opportunistically.'' The union will be in a position to impose
serious damage on employers in situations where the skills required to
perform work tasks are specific to the firm and require a substantial
training period. In contrast, if the skills required to perform work
96. See supra part HI.A-B.
97. See generally Wachter & Cohen, supra note 16, at 1358-64 (discussing workers' invest-




101. See Nnw YoRK PROCEEDiNGS, supra note 16, at 113-19.
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tasks are mainly of a general nature, the employer will be able to con-
tinue operating by hiring essentially untrained temporary help.1°2 In
this situation, the union is not able to expropriate any rents. The
flight attendants' strike in the fall of 1993 at American Airlines pro-
vides a good example of these theoretical concepts in operation.
2. American Airlines Case Example
On November 18, 1993, at the beginning of the Thanksgiving
travel season, American Airline's flight attendants went on strike.10 3
At the heart of the dispute was the issue of pay, particularly the
ramifications of American's "two-tier" wage scale that the airline had
instituted about a decade eailier.1°4 Under the two-tier pay structure,
newly-hired flight attendants and other employees were paid mark-
edly less than employees that were already working at the airline prior
to the airline's enactment of the new salary structure. 0 5 Commenting
on the problems that had arisen under the two-tier pay structure, one
striking flight attendant stated that "'[t]en years ago, [Mr. Crandall,
American's CEO] lit a fuse, and now the keg is going off.' "106 In
terms of our analysis above,"0 7 it could be asserted that because of the
two-tier wage program, newly hired flight attendants had made firm-
specific investments in American Airlines. They had accepted argua-
bly below-market wages in the hope of a long-term future with the
carrier.' All the flight attendants had also participated in at least ten
102. Id.
103. See Maxon, supra note 11; O'Brian, supra note 11.
104. The 1983 negotiations between American Airlines and its employees were noteworthy
in that American succeeded in achieving major labor concessions at a time when the airline was
neither under the threat of bankruptcy nor in serious financial difficulty. The negotiations are
also noteworthy because of the two-tier wage agreement that was immediately copied by others
within the airline industry and elsewhere. Peter Cappelli, Airlines, in COLLEC'IVE BARGAININO
IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 135-86 (David B. Lipsky & Clifford B. Donn eds., 1987). See generally
Note, Two-Tier Wage Discrimination and the Duty of Fair Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 631
(1985) (explaining the processes behind the two-tier wage system).
105. 'IWo-tier pay agreements became increasingly popular during the 1980s. By 1988 about
forty-two percent of all labor contracts had some variation of a two-tier system. See Peter Cap-
pelli & Peter D. Scherer, Assessing Worker Attitudes Under a Two-Tier Wage Plan, 43 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REv. 225, 226 (1990).
106. James S. Hirsch, AMR Is Hurt, but Stays Aloft Despite Strike, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22,
1993, at A3 (quoting striking flight attendant).
107. See supra part III.B.
108. Of course, some of the flight attendants on strike in 1993 may have been employed by
American Airlines prior to the 1983 institution of the two-tier pay system, and thus not directly
impacted by its "lower-tier" pay scale. Nevertheless, it appears that the whole thrust of the 1983
negotiations was on asking these employees to forgo wage increases and other benefits in return
for a strong assurance of job security from the airline. See Cappelli, supra note 104, at 157.
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days of firm-specific airline training as required by Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA") regulations.10 9
When the flight attendants went on strike, though, they certainly
had every reason to expect the airline to hire temporary help to keep
operating.110 The airline, however, forcefully emphasized its rights
under Mackay to permanently replace the striking workers."' A
taped telephone hotline told workers that "[a]ny flight attendant who
chooses to strike, whether it is for 20 minutes or for 20 days, may be
permanently replaced.""' An airline spokesman stated even more di-
rectly that strikers were "operating on the assumption that they [had]
a job to come back to," but that they were "being misled by the
union" and were "sadly mistaken.""' 3 The airline clearly intended to
exercise its rights under Mackay to hire not temporary, but permanent
replacements for the striking workers.
Moreover, even though the strike ended up lasting only five days,
numerous potential replacement workers had already expressed inter-
est in permanently filling these positions." 4 Indeed, because of the
thousands of airline jobs lost" 5 in the wake of the Airline Deregula-
tion Act of 1978,116 even virulently "anti-union/worker" executives
such as Frank Lorenzo" 7 (a man one union president once said has "a
mind that would make Machiavelli look like Gomer Pyle" ' 8 ) have
had relatively little trouble attracting permanent replacement workers
for their airlines. 119
Consequently, it could be argued that these employees have also made firm-specific investments
in American Airlines.
109. See Maxon, supra note 11, at 24A.
110. See generally CHARLES R. PERRY ET AL, OPERATING DURING STRIKES: COMPANY Ex-
PERIENCE, NLRB POLICIES, AND GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS (1982) (outlining strategies for
companies wishing to operate during strikes and discussing experiences of companies which have
done this).
111. See Maxon supra note 11, at 24A.
112. i
113. Id.
114. Id. (discussing scheduled classes for 300 replacement workers that had already signed
on).
115. See Hon. Bob Graham, Protecting Airline Employees, Protecting the Public Interest, 10
HoFsTRA LAB. LJ. 1, 2, 6-10 (1992).
116. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1557 (1988)).
117. See ARTHUR A. SLOANE & FRED WrrnEY, LABOR RELATIONS 254-55 (1994).
118. Id. at 254 (citing NEWSWEEK, Mar. 25, 1989, at 20).
119. See generally id at 146 (citing hiring of replacements at Continental and Eastern Air-
lines, both controlled by Mr. Lorenzo). This, of course, is not to imply that it wasn't at times a
"bumpy" ride for these airlines even though they continued operating for significant periods of
1995]
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In sum, the Mackay doctrine appears, as we developed above, 2 °
to give employers the upper hand with respect to workers, like the
flight attendants at American Airlines, that have made firm-specific
investments who later strike. Despite the employees' investments in
the firm, Mackay permits employers to hire not temporary, but per-
manent striker replacements. Moreover, it appears that many em-
ployers will have little difficulty attracting such replacements despite
the employers' nonstellar employee relations reputation..
Conversely, however, the American Airlines scenario also illus-
trates the opportunistic leverage potentially open to unions if the
Mackay doctrine is simply overturned without more. Because of
White House involvement in the strike,' 2' ultimately culminating in
President Clinton's direct intervention, 22 and a FAA requirement
that airlines must train flight attendants for at least ten days,123 the
airline was essentially operating during the beginning of the strike in
an environment where the actual deployment of permanent striker
replacements was extremely difficult." In essence, it could be argued
that during this period American Airlines was "de facto" operating as
if the Mackay doctrine had been repealed, a situation that enabled the
union to arguably behave opportunistically. Responding to airline
threats to permanently replace workers, flight attendants union presi-
dent Denise Hedges called for an eleven-day strike, knowing that
training takes ten days. She stated that she wondered "how they can
replace 90 percent of our workers in eleven days."'" Given these cir-
cumstances and the President's intervention, the airline acceded to
union demands after the strike's fifth day.126 Even so, the airline suf-
fered tremendous financial losses, attributing the vast majority of a
1993 fourth quarter loss of $253 million to the strike. 27
time during strikes. See Bridget O'Brian, In the Wake of Eastern Airlines' Demise, Rival Carriers
Swoop In for the Pieces, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1991, at B1 (chronology of events).
120. See supra part III.C.2-D.1.
121. Because of its potentially disruptive effect on the general public during the
Thanksgiving holiday, White House officials were involved with, and monitoring, the strike al-
most from its onset. See Ingersoll & O'Brian, supra note 12.
122. Id.
123. See Maxon, supra note 11, at 24A.
124. See generally iL (discussing the FAA requirements and the number of workers needing
replacement).
125. Id
126. See Ingersoll & O'Brian, supra note 12.
127. Bridget O'Brian, AMR Posts Widened Fourth-Period Loss Largely on Effects of Attend-
ant's Strike, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1994, at A2.
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Most interestingly, and consistent with the theme of this Arti-
cle,'" in early 1994 American Airlines and its pilot's union announced
a new so-called "Fresh Approach" to labor relations. 2 9 The thrust of
this new approach, specifically designed to avoid the "messy denoue-
ment" of American's contract talks with the flight attendants, is on
very wide ranging negotiations between the parties. 30
3. Summary
In sum, we assert that the key distinction that should be made in
the law of striker replacements is one based on the degree of firm-
specific investments made by the workers involved in the strike. By
focusing on that feature, the law could prevent the use of a strike or
the hiring of permanent replacements as an opportunistic behavior
weapon designed to expropriate the other party's rents.
A major obstacle to the implementation of a scheme such as the
one we propose is obviously how to make distinctions of this kind.
Although several proxies could potentially be available to the courts
or the NLRB, there are no clear guidelines or definitions that facili-
tate such distinctions. In Part IV below we argue that unions and em-
ployers are, through broad-scale negotiations of the general type
currently being engaged in by American Airlines and its pilot's union,
in the best position to make such distinctions. We further argue that if
courts or Congress make the decision of whether to hire striker
replacements a mandatory issue of bargaining, unions and employers
could make the distinction between firm-specific and general invest-
ments made by workers and thus enforce the contract so as to mini-
mize strategic behavior.
128. See infra part IV (outlining our proposed "negotiations approach").
129. See American Air, Pilots Agree to 7unetable for Contract Talks, WALL ST. J., Jan 19,
1994, at A4.
130. Id. To date, however, these negotiations have not been going well. See Future of
American Airlines Depends on Negotiations With Unions, Official Says, 1994 DAILY LAB. RnP.
(BNA) No. 184, at D14 (Sept. 26, 1994).
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: A NEGOTIATIONS
APPROACH
A. BACKGROUND
Among the goals of the NLRA was the promotion and encour-
agement of collective bargaining. 131 The sponsors of the NLRA
viewed collective bargaining as the means to promote a new labor pol-
icy without having to directly regulate the terms of the employment
relationship. 32 In enacting the NLRA, Congress rejected a more in-
terventionist approach 33 and opted instead for a system that empha-
sized the distinct roles of labor and management in which outcomes
were to be determined by the ability of the parties to impose eco-
nomic pressure on each other through the negotiation process.
134
It is somewhat paradoxical that among the several alternatives
that have been advanced to deal with the striker replacements is-
sue, 135 there has been no attempt to use the collective bargaining pro-
cess as a possible solution. We argue that by incorporating the striker
replacement decision into the bargaining process a non-zero-sum situ-
ation can be created which makes both parties better off,'36 while at
the same time advancing the NLRA's objectives of industrial peace
and collective bargaining.
B. THE ADVANTAGES OF NEGOTIATION
So far, this Article has argued that the main problem with the
current state of striker replacement public policy is the inability of the
131. The Act provides:
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and elimi-
nate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and pro-
cedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employ-
ment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
132. See Leo 'Troy, Will a More Interventionist NLRA Revive Organized Labor?, 13 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. PoL. 583 (1991). See generally Getman & Marshall, supra note 3, at 1807-08 (dis-
cussing the traditional collective bargaining model of industrial relations).
133. See Troy, supra note 132.
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
136. In the game theory parlance, we contend that bargaining over the striker replacements
issue creates a cooperative solution. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW
AND ECONOMICS 92-94 (1988) (arguing that in the cooperative game theory of bargaining, the
parties can both benefit by cooperating with each other).
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Mackay doctrine to distinguish between "opportunistic behavior" by
either the union or the employer, and behavior that is "non-opportu-
nistic." Therefore, whatever reform proposal is introduced should be
measured by its ability to redress this problem.
The proposal we advance-is based on the assumption that through
the negotiation process the parties themselves will be best able to re-
solve disputes concerning the hiring of striker replacements by making
the necessary trade-offs and establishing rules that commit them to
mutually enforce the contract. In the law and economics parlance,
"[i]f someone values an asset.., more than its owner, then there is
scope for mutual gain by exchange."' 37 Public policy should then fo-
cus on providing the proper framework in which negotiations or mu-
tual exchange should take place. In this sense, the role of the law is
threefold. First, the legal framework should allocate the initial rights
or entitlements in a way that increases the likelihood of successful bar-
gaining."' Second, the law should seek to minimize the transaction
costs associated with bargaining.'39 Finally, the legal framework
should provide adequate enforcement mechanisms for cases in which
bargaining fails."4 Our proposal, we submit, addresses all of these
issues.
The "Coase theorem"'' recognizes the fact that in the absence of
transaction costs, parties will bargain over the efficient allocations of
resources regardless of their initial legal entitlement. 42 As Coase
himself has pointed out, however, bargaining situations characterized
by zero transaction costs are rare. 43
137. Id. at 6.
138. See infra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
141. The theorem was first suggested in Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J.
L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Among the various formulations of the Coase theorem are the following:
"[I]f there are no obstacles to exchanging legal entitlements, they will be allocated efficiently by
private agreement, so the initial allocation by the courts does not influence the efficiency of the
final allocation"; and "the assignment of property rights does not matter when the transaction
costs are zero." CooTER & ULEN, supra note 136, at 101 n.11 (quoting Robert Cooter, The
Coase Theorem, in THE Naw PALGRAvE (1985)).
142. Note that the theorem states that allocation will be efficient regardless of the initial
entitlement, not that it will be invariant to the assignment of rights. See COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 136, at 105 n.15.
143. See RONALD H. COASE, THE FiRm, am MARKET, AND m LAW (1988).
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In the presence of transaction costs, efficient allocation is increas-
ingly difficult.144 Transaction costs can be in the form of communica-
tion costs,1 45 monitoring costs,146 or strategic costs. 47 In the presence
of transaction costs, an important consideration will'be the way in
which we define rights. They must be defined in a way that minimizes
the transaction costs associated with fixing, by means of private con-
tracts, inefficient allocations." ,
We submit that under the Mackay approach to striker replace-
ments, the decision to hire striker replacements is not amenable to
resolution through the collective bargaining process because the rule
makes bargaining over this decision too costly for a union and makes
it easy for an employer to behave opportunistically. In this sense the
Mackay rule does not minimize transaction costs.
Given that there are transaction costs in the collective bargaining
process, the initial allocation of rights could affect the achievement of
efficient outcomes. The initial allocation of rights will affect the likeli-
hood of achieving a bargaining solution. 49 For example, under Mac-
kay the employer can hire permanent replacements without consulting
the union. That is, the legal entitlement lies with the employer. As
has been developed above,5 ° this arguably allows the employer to get
144. "In the presence of transaction costs, the default settings established by legal rules have
economic consequences. In setting default entitlements, therefore, the Board and courts often
implicitly, if not explicitly, consider the economic consequences." Wachter & Cohen, supra note
16, at 1366; see also Stewart J. Schawb, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72 CoaR.
NELL L. REv. 245 (1987) (discussing the application of the Coase Theorem to collective
bargaining).
145. "Communication costs" refers to the ability or inability of parties to a negotiation to
clearly define their threat (or "bottom line" bargaining) positions. "The rights of the parties
define their positions or threat points in legal disputes." CooTER & ULEN, supra note 136, at
100. This type of cost is particularly critical to the striker replacement debate. Contrary to what
Professor Michael H. LeRoy (LeRoy, supra note 13, at 269-70, 301-07), argues, it is difficult to
reconcile within the same paradigm or conceptual framework the Mackay ruling with the limita-
tions imposed by the courts on the use of striker replacements and the arguable right of employ-
ees to strike under the NLRA. This uncertainty is likely to increase communication costs and
make it more difficult to achieve efficient solutions under the present scheme.
146. Monitoring costs relate to the ability of the parties to enforce their bargain. See
COOTER & UL.N, supra note 136, at 100.
147. Strategic costs include the costs associated with miscalculating the response of the other
party to a given strategic move. These costs are likely to be low when the parties are engaged in
a long and continuing bargaining relationship. Id. at 101.
148. For a brief, but excellent description of some of the implications of the Coase theorem,
see David D. Friedman, The World According to Coase, 38 LAW ScH. REc. 4 (1992).
149. See, eg., LESLIE, supra note 84, at 369-73 (pointing out that initial allocation of entitle-
ments in labor law could completely prevent bargaining due to the complexities of the collective
bargaining process).
150. See supra notes 26-41 and accompanying text.
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rid of the union by negotiating to an impasse and then hiring perma-
nent replacements. The employer has no real incentive to negotiate
over the striker replacement issue because any negotiation will by def-
inition make the employer worse off. Even if the union places a high
value on protecting at least those employees that are subject to oppor-
tunistic behavior, and even if the union is willing to compromise on
the protection of other (less-skilled) employees or on any other issue,
no bargaining is likely to ever take place under the Mackay rule. In
this sense, and using the language of bargaining theory, the Mackay
doctrine makes it less likely that bargaining will take place and in that
sense it is inefficient. It is necessary, therefore, that any reform pro-
posal start by changing the initial allocation of rights-in this case, by
granting union protection against the hiring of permanent striker
replacements.
On the other hand, giving unions protection against the hiring of
permanent replacements, without anything more, will also result, as
developed above,'51 in the likelihood of opportunistic behavior by the
union. Recall that under the internal labor market model, employees
that have received firm-specific training can expropriate the em-
ployer's rents by engaging in behavior, such as withholding their job
effort, that increases monitoring costs of the firm. Thus, if unions are
allowed to strike, knowing that their members cannot be permanently
replaced, they will be free to engage in strikes and in that way expro-
priate rents due to the employer under their agreement.152
The solution we propose involves first providing unions and strik-
ing workers with the protection against permanent replacements by
changing the initial legal right, and second, making the striker replace-
ment issue a mandatory subject of bargaining. By providing this pro-
tection, we will make it more costly for employers to force a strike in
the hope of getting rid of the union. The employer will only be able to
accomplish this by paying a fairly high price: closing operations. 53 By
making it a mandatory subject of bargaining, we minimize transaction
costs by giving the union, the party which probably values this right
151. See supra notes 59-60, 121-27 and accompanying text.
152. See Peter G. Nash & Jonathan R. Mook, Strike Replacement Legislation: If It Ain't
Broke, Don't Fix It, 16 EMPLOYEE RELi LJ. 317 (1990-91).
153. As Wachter and Cohen point out, this sunk cost should deter illegal behavior. See
Wachter & Cohen, supra note 16, at 1378-85.
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the most,154 the opportunity to exchange the protection against per-
manent replacements for other bargaining demands they might value
more highly. In this sense, the proposal facilitates bargaining by mak-
ing more explicit the types of exchanges the union has to make.
Our proposal will also allow the union and the employer, them-
selves, to make a distinction between the skill level of their workers
and therefore mutually enforce. implicit contracts concerning human
capital investments. Finally, leaving the resolution of the striker re-
placement issue to the parties themselves, through the collective bar-
gaining process, allows for a non-zero-sum solution.155
Implementation of this approach, though, raises a number of issues
concerning other provisions of the NLRA which we discuss below.
C. STRIKER REPLACEMENTS: MANDATORY OR PERMISSIVE ISSUE?
The NLRA imposes on the employer and the union a duty to
bargain in good faith. 56 This duty requires the parties to bargain to
impasse over mandatory issues. 5 7 Permissive issues can be brought to
the bargaining table, but neither party is required to bargain over
them.158
A question that is raised by the proposal suggested in this Article
is whether the duty to bargain over the decision to hire permanent
154. The rationale for arguing that unions will, as opposed to the employer, be more likely
to bargain over the striker replacement issue if given the initial legal entitlement, is based on the
realities of the industrial relations process. First, the protection against striker replacement does
not make the strike a "risk free" venture for the union. "The hardship of doing without a
paycheck and health insurance puts enormous pressure on the strikers to settle a dispute as soon
as possible. Most American workers have no cushion, no money socked away to make house
payments and car payments, to buy food or to pay doctors' bills." H.R. REP. No. 103-116, supra
note 7, at 33. Second, unreasonable pressures or unwillingness to bargain over this issue could
represent a matter of survival for the union. "[W]orkers have no incentive to make demands
that will throw their employers into bankruptcy or otherwise cause permanent economic harm to
their employers. The worker, after all, is dependent on the employer's long-term economic
health. Workers realize this, and this realization significantly moderates worker demands." Id.
155. See infra part IV.F.
156. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1988). 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) defines the scope of this duty:
"For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obliga-
tion of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment ......
157. Bargaining subjects have been classified by the Supreme Court as mandatory, permis-
sive, or illegal. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
Mandatory subjects are defined as those that "regulate wages, hours, and other conditions of the
relationship between employer and employees." GoRMAN, supra note 21, at 498.
158. Permissive issues are those dealing with subjects other than wages, hours, and working
conditions. See GopmAN, supra note 21, at 498.
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replacements can be characterized as a mandatory issue of bargaining.
We submit that bargaining during contract negotiations over the utili-
zation of striker replacements in the case of a strike should clearly be
considered a mandatory topic.
Although there do not appear to be any cases directly on point, 5 9
we submit that the striker replacement issue could be considered a
mandatory subject based on several grounds. First, like a no-strike
provision,160 bargaining over the use of striker replacements involves
a critical aspect of the relationship between the employer and the
union, and should on these grounds be seen as a mandatory bargain-
ing topic. 161 Second, similar to work rules such as attendance and ab-
senteeism policies, the striker replacements decision deals with the
obligation of the employees to report to work under the employment
contract. 162 As such, they regulate an issue central to the day-to-day
employer-employee relationship. 63 Finally, making the striker
replacements provision a mandatory issue of bargaining could be sup-
ported as a means of advancing the objectives of the NLRA in avoid-
ing industrial strife. 64
The NLRB and the federal courts have consistently held, how-
ever, that interest arbitration provisions, in which the parties agree to
have an arbitration hearing in the case of a bargaining impasse, are
nonmandatory topics of bargaining. 65 In NLRB v. Columbus Print-
ing Pressmen Assistants' Union No. 252,166 the Fifth Circuit upheld the
Board's holding that a union that bargained to impasse on a provision
that required the parties to submit to arbitration disputes over the
159. Professors Cox, Bok, Gorman, and Fmkin do raise the issue rhetorically in their leading
labor law casebook, but without any specific discussion or explanation. See ARCHIBALD COX ET
AL, CASES AND M TERIALS ON LABOR LAW 498 (1991).
160. No-strike clauses are provisions in the collective bargaining agreement in which the
union agrees not to call a work stoppage during the term of the collective bargaining agreement.
See GoRMAN, supra note 21, at 604-20.
161. See Shell Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1948) (holding that employer's insistence upon
including a no-strike clause was not a refusal to bargain).
162. See GORMAN, supra note 21, at 507.
163. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that negotia-
tion over safety rules is mandatory); Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., Inc., 121 N.L.R.B.
953 (1958) (holding that employer must bargain over workload).
164. See Bethlehem Steel, 89 N.L.R.B. 341 (1950); see also GoRMAN, supra note 21, at 507
(stating that making striker replacement a mandatory topic would "advance the basic statutory
policy of avoidance of industrial strife").
165. GoRmAN, supra note 21, at 508.
166. 543 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1976).
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negotiation of terms of a contract in subsequent agreements, was bar-
gaining in bad faith. The rationale for holding that the interest arbi-
tration clause was a nonmandatory issue was that the effect of such a
provision on the terms and conditions of employment during the con-
tract period is at best remote. 167 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit, in the
recent case of Land Air Delivery, Inc. v. NLRB,' 68 held that an em-
ployer's decision to permanently subcontract work during a strike is a
mandatory subject of bargaining. This holding seems to imply that the
hiring of permanent strike replacements is not a mandatory issue of
bargaining. The court of appeals noted that it perceived a distinction
"between replacing strikers with permanent employees and replacing
them with permanent subcontractors,' 69 in that permanent subcon-
tracting more directly impinges on the scope of the bargaining unit.17 0
Thus, statutory reform may be necessary in order to clearly make
the issue of striker replacements a mandatory subject of bargaining
under the NLRA. The issue seems to be quite ripe for consideration
by President Clinton's commission studying labor law reform. 171
D. SURVIVAL OF THE STRIKER REPLACEMENT CLAUSE
The proposal we advance here raises a second issue: Could a ne-
gotiated provision dealing with the issue of striker replacements sur-
vive the expiration of an existing labor contract? Certain provisions
of collective bargaining agreements have been held to survive the ex-
piration of the contract. For example, in Nolde Brothers Inc. v. Local
358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union,72 the Supreme Court
held that the expiration of a contract did not terminate the parties'
obligation to arbitrate a dispute that arose under the contract. In
Nolde, the Court stated that "[t]he contracting parties' confidence in
the arbitration process and an arbitrator's presumed special compe-
tence in matters concerning bargaining agreements does not terminate
with the contract."' 73
167. In its decision, the NLRB emphasized that contrary to the overall policy of the NLRA,
the interest arbitration provision constituted interference with collective bargaining and the un-
fettered availability of economic weapons. The Columbus Printing Pressmen & Assistants'
Union No. 252, 219 N.L.R.B. 268, 272 (1975).
168. 862 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
169. Id. at 357.
170. Id. at 357-58.
171. See generally 7 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 309 (Mar. 31, 1993) (discussing President Clin-
ton's Workplace Cooperation Commission).
172. 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
173. Id. at 254.
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Although arbitration clauses appear to survive the termination of
collective bargaining agreements, obligations under no-strike clauses
do not appear to survive. Thus, for example, in United Steelworkers v.
Fort Pitt Steel Casting Div.,174 the Third Circuit held that a no-strike
clause did not prevent the union from engaging in an economic strike
following the termination of the contract.
Thus, it does not appear to be clear whether a provision dealing
with the use of striker replacements will survive the termination of an
agreement. We submit that such survival must be made clear as part
of any statutory reforms that implement our "negotiations. approach."
E. DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
Under a "negotiations approach" of the type we propose, unions
may seek different treatment of different employees in the bargaining
unit they represent. This different treatment potentially raises ques-
tions regarding the requirement that unions fairly represent all em-
ployees in the given bargaining unit. The "duty of fair representation"
is a judicially created obligation on the part of the union to represent
fairly all employees in the bargaining unit. The duty was developed
by the courts because of the union's role as the exclusive bargaining
agent for the bargaining unit. This duty was first announced in a Rail-
way Labor Act case, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad,75
where the Supreme Court struck down a bargaining agreement that
discriminated against black members of the bargaining unit. The
Court found embedded in the principle of exclusive representation an
implied obligation to represent all employees fairly, and without hos-
tile discrimination.'76 The duty is based on the same principles that
underlie the duty the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give
equal protection to those for whom it legislates. 77
The duty of fair representation clearly applies to the negotiations
process, and a union would be clearly held to violate this duty if it
negotiated a provision in a contract that did not benefit all covered
employees in the same manner, or a provision that benefitted some
employees in the bargaining unit to the detriment of other covered
174. 635 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981).
175. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
176. Id. at 204.
177. Id. In Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), the Court in a per curiam
decision reversed a ruling below that proclaimed that federal courts generally had no jurisdiction
over breach of duty of fair representation claims, thus extending the duty of fair representation
also to unions granted bargaining agent status under Section 9(a) of the NLRA.
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employees. 78 Thus, a union negotiating over the striker replacement
provision could potentially get involved in a duty of fair representa-
tion problem if, for example, the union were to allow permanent
striker replacements for certain workers such as general skill workers,
but not for others, such as firm-specific skill workers.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffinan,179 the Supreme Court held, how-
ever, that the duty of fair representation ensures only that a union
operates in "good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its
discretion."' 80 In reviewing duty of fair representation charges against
a union concerning contract negotiations, courts apply a "relevancy"
test. Under the relevancy test, unions can distinguish among their
constituencies if the distinctions are based on grounds relevant to the
union's statutory purposes.' 8' For example, courts have found that
seniority-based patterns of discrimination are within the "wide range
of reasonableness' 8 2 that union negotiators are permitted in service
of statutory purposes. 83 What is relevant includes the ability to con-
sider the different expectations of various employees. That is, there
is nothing wrong with having a union negotiate a contract provision
that is designed to reward the expectations of a group of employees
already within the bargaining unit, even if the union ignores the inter-
ests of other employees within the same unit.
In Seaboard World Airlines v. Transport Workers Union,"8 the
Second Circuit considered the validity of a collective bargaining
agreement that provided displacement benefits to a limited group of
incumbent flight navigators, but did not guarantee the same kind of
benefits to new hires. Relying on the expectations analysis, the Sec-
ond Circuit held that the union had in fact performed its duty of fair
representation by affording displacement benefits to only those navi-
gators who had entered the bargaining unit with the expectation of
permanent employment 85 According to the court, the new hires en-
tered the unit knowing that their jobs might not last, and thus were
n6t unjustifiably discriminated against by the union's actions.
178. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 338.
181. I& at 341-43; see also Note, supra note 104 (discussing the validity of two-tier wage
structures under the NLRA's duty of fair representation).
182. Ford Motor, 345 U.S. at 338.
183. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944).
184. 443 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1971).
185. See Note, supra note 104, at 639.
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Thus, it appears that unions will not necessarily be subjected to
duty of fair representation violations when negotiating contracts that
allow for different treatment of unit members in terms of the perma-
nency of their replacements in case of a strike. This is true so long as
the union conducts such negotiations "in good faith."
F. WHAT IF NEGOTIATIONS FAIL?: THE ITALIAN MODEL AND
BEYOND
It could be argued that our proposal will not, in practice, produce
results any different than could be accomplished by merely overruling
the Mackay doctrine.186 That is, under our proposal unions could ar-
guably bargain to impasse over the striker replacement issue, call a
strike, and then behave opportunistically, because employers will not
be allowed to replace economic strikers. We argue from both a practi-
cal and theoretical perspective that a contrary dynamic will likely
prevail.
As discussed above,187 our proposal facilitates the bargaining pro-
cess by distributing the initial allocation of rights in a way that is con-
ducive to mutual gain exchange. Bargaining over the striker
replacement issue is not likely to occur under current law because em-
ployers are given the right to permanently replace strikers and the
general issue is not clearly defined as a mandatory topic of bargaining.
Thus, under the current scheme of things, there is almost no incentive
for employers to bargain with respect to this issue. By overruling
Mackay, while at the same time making the striker replacement issue
a mandatory topic of bargaining, our proposal facilitates exchange and
thus increases the likelihood that the two parties will reach an
agreement.
Going beyond this theoretical construct, it is also important to
note that negotiations of this kind are feasible from a practical per-
spective. For example, they could, as discussed above,188 easily be in-
corporated into the broad-scale "Fresh Approach" type of
negotiations currently being conducted between American Airlines
and its pilots' union. Indeed, provisions similar to what our proposal
186. We are indebted to Professor William Corbett of Louisiana State University Law
Center for extensive discussions on this issue.
187. See supra part IV.A-B.
188. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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envisions have in fact already been negotiated by unions and compa-
nies, albeit on a more limited scale. The collective bargaining agree-
ment between the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
and the Olin Corporation, for example, provides: "The [e]mployees as
well as the Union shall cross all picket lines for the performance of
work which is essential to the maintenance of the Company's plant
and equipment for standby operations."'189 Similarly, the agreement
between the Steelworkers and Harbison-Walker Refractories, pro-
vides that:
No strike or lockout shall occur at the establishment covered by this
Agreement during the life of this Agreement, and continuous kilns
shall be maintained at all times at a temperature which will result in
no loss of ware or damage to the kilns, and periodic kilns under fire
shall be burned off. Pumping operations shall also be continued
during any strike or work stoppage that may occur as stated
above.19°
These two labor contracts clearly indicate the ability of unions and
employers to, through the collective negotiations process, devise rules
governing behavior in the event of, and during, strikes.
An instructive example can also be found in recent labor legisla-
tion enacted in Italy which regulates strike activity involving essential
public services.' 91 Act 146 of the Italian Labor Code, enacted in
1990, 1 follows the recent trend in Italian labor law towards consen-
sual regulation. It relies in part on collective bargaining as the means
of regulating the impact of strikes on the provision of "essential
services."' 93
189. See THE BuREAu OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, 2 CoLLECTIVE BARoAINING NEGO-TATIONS
AND CoNrcrs: BAsIC PATrER S 77:376 (1991).
190. Id
191. Id at 77:377.
192. Act No. 146 of June 12,1990, 137 Gazz. Uff. 6, June 14,1990, translated in I.L.O. Legis-
lative Series, ITA 1, at 93 (1990).
193. Id at 94. Act 146 also relies on a variety of regulatory sources such as constitutional
principles, administrative agencies, public executive orders, and court decisions. Id. at 96, 98-
101.
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Indeed, collective bargaining agreements have proven to be the
main source of strike regulation under the new Italian law.194 Agree-
ments have been negotiated with respect to most of the so-called es-
sential services covered under the Act. 95 Bargaining has occurred at
both the national and local levels, with local agreements being used as
a means of tailoring the rules to the specific needs of the participants.
For example, the national agreement covering urban and suburban
transportation establishes the principle that during a strike, service
must be guaranteed for six hours a day at "peak times." The local
agreements then specify the definition of peak times and indicate the
number of employees required to guarantee the service, as well as the
way of selecting those employees.1
96
The Italian experience demonstrates, albeit in a different setting,
that bargaining is likely to occur on the issue of the regulation of
strike activity when and if the proper legal framework and structure is
provided to the parties. Although we do not advocate the adoption of
the Italian model in the United States, we believe that it provides
some hope that a negotiations approach to the striker replacement
issue of the kind we propose could bring positive net outcomes to un-
ions, employees, employers, and the general public.
V. CONCLUSION
The striker replacement issue and the proposed legislative over-
ruling of the Mackay doctrine are highly controversial and command
considerable attention. The issue is, as exemplified in the strike dur-
ing the fall of 1993 at American Airlines, fraught with emotion, with
one side decrying the "union-busting hiring of scabs" and the other
pronouncing the right to hire permanent striker replacements as "es-
sential to the preservation of free enterprise and a free society."
Professors Wachter and Cohen and other scholars have stressed
the "economic efficiency" of the Mackay doctrine as it currently oper-
ates. We, however, dispute the contention that the Mackay doctrine
194. See Tiziano Treu, Strikes in Essential Services in Italy: An Extreme Case of Pluralistic
Regulation, in THE CHANGrNG FACE OF LABou LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: LIBER
AMmOCUM FOR CLYDE W. SuMMERs 332-53 (Roger Blanpain & Manfred Weiss eds., 1993).
195. These include: schools, telecommunications, banking, railroads, urban and suburban
transport, hospitals, and others. Id at 343.
196. Other provisions that have been successfully negotiated under Act 146 include: the
fixing of certain days or periods of time during which the strikes are excluded, and the exclusion
or limitation of certain kinds of strikes. Id. at 341.
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promotes "economic efficiency." In particular, we believe that em-
ployees that have made firm-specific investments are "inefficiently"
vulnerable to an employer's opportunistic behavior given the ability of
employers to permanently replace such workers during a strike.
To reform this situation we advocate: (1) the repeal of the Mac-
kay doctrine, thereby granting unions protection against the hiring of
permanent replacements; and (2) requiring that the issue of striker
replacements be explicitly made a "mandatory" bargaining subject
under the NLRA, with any agreements regarding this issue clearly
surviving contract expiration. With the 1990 Italian strike regulation
statute serving as a general model, the idea is that the resolution of
this controversial issue can be most efficiently accomplished through
negotiations between the parties themselves. We recommend these
proposed statutory reforms to legislators and others currently study-
ing reforms of the NLRA.
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